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This article investigates Marx’s Capital as a theoretical resource for analysing both the form 
and content of the modern corporation. We assess two recent contributions critiquing the 
corporation. The article argues that Marx advanced from his initial ambivalent comments on 
the form of the joint stock company and the credit system to a more categorical critique. 
We assess Marx’s concepts of the concentration and centralisation of capital, fictitious 
capital and rent in analysing the corporation. Next we note Engels important contribution 
filling in from the early limited liability company to monopoly capital and modern 
imperialism. The article ends with two examples of how these concepts apply in concrete 
analysis. The work is highly preliminary and is intended to open a more theoretically 





The socialist strategy for corporations is distinct from the reformist strategy, which sees 
them as legitimate wealth creators that have grown out of democratic control. The reform 
strategy is based on the liberal premise of separation between formal political equality, and 
the real social class inequality that is exploitation. Within socialism corporate reform began 
with its first frank enunciation by Eduard Bernstein; it then took on a more radical and 
populist turn in the US at the beginning of the twentieth century, where it was strongly 
influential again in the 1930s; and is back again today.   
What about a specifically socialist strategy? How to tackle the power of multinational 
corporations in the transition to socialism? Is a socialist corporation possible?  Can the 
existing corporate structures simply be laid hold of and transformed into progressive 
economic agents?   
The corporate form as such presents a set of challenges to Marxist theory. This article 
investigates Marx’s Capital as a theoretical resource for analysing both the form and 
content of the modern corporation. We start by evaluating two recent contributions 
critiquing the corporation. The article argues that Marx advanced from his initial ambivalent 
comments on the form of the joint stock company and the credit system to a more 
categorical critique. We assess the concepts of the concentration and centralisation of 
capital, fictitious capital and rent in analysing the corporation. Next we note Engels 
important contribution filling in from the early limited liability company to monopoly capital 
and modern imperialism. The article ends with two examples of how these concepts apply 
in concrete analysis. The work is highly preliminary and is intended to open a more 
theoretically informed approach to analysis and critique of the multinational corporation.   
 
Review of Two Recent Contributions 
In reviewing two leading examples from the contemporary literature my general purpose is 
to assess their analyses and to evaluate their socialist direction.  The main area of 
theoretical concern is the need to deepen connections between the legally defined form of 
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the modern corporation with the socio-economic relations of the corporation. Related to this 
is their political direction, are we talking reform or revolution? 
Bakan’s ‘New’ Corporation 
Joel Bakan is well known for his earlier contribution The Corporation, made both as a film as 
well as a book (2000). Here I will focus on his latest work, effectively a follow up: The New 
Corporation.  
The main purpose of this book is to expose as false the claims by big corporations that they 
are newly socially and environmentally responsible.  Bakan does this by comparing their fine 
words, the selling of ‘stakeholder capitalism’ at great events such as the Davos summit, and 
their foul deeds, exemplified by Trump’s fulsome welcome by the Davos elite for having cut 
their corporate taxes (2020:24). Bakan reveals the realities of corporate ambition behind 
their spin of good citizenship, as for example the drive to privatise education and other 
public services. This could have been taken further, for example the extensive interview and 
commentary with former chief executive of BP John Browne omits to mention the good 
Lord’s recommendation to charge UK students fees for their higher education, or his role in 
covering up for death squads in Colombia. Even so, Bakan does show that corporations “are 
a large part of the reason things have gotten worse so dramatically and quickly over the last 
two decades” (2020:4). He sees that global resistance has surged as a counterforce in the 
last decade (2020:5), although again he could have noted that there have been generations 
of resistance in most parts of the Global South.  
The economic leadership of capitalism, those supposedly progressive Davos devotees so 
effectively revealed by Bakan, are navigating a pathway of reform. The problem is that the 
very best they can possibly achieve is still well short of the minimum set of comprehensive 
actions required to save the planet from ecological disaster. On this point Bakan is right 
(2020:43), the heralded Paris Agreement was itself the result of heavy corporate lobbying 
and social democratic possibilism that fell well short of the target needed, a maximum of 1 
degree Celsius. Taking this further, the target had been clearly stated but rejected at the 
previous Copenhagen COP summit.    At time of writing a flurry of new forecasts on global 
energy usage are notably optimistic that the world can meet Paris targets for 2050, largely 
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because of the cut in demand for fossil fuels wrought by Covid 19 (DNVGL, 2020). Choose 
your catastrophe.  
Bakan points out that the ‘new’ corporation’s adoption of wider values ‘inevitably stop short 
of measures that interfere with profits or contradict business models’ (2020:41). He argues 
that this restriction is not personal, rather due to institutional imperatives (2020:34,106). 
But it is here that Bakan’s disciplinary grounding in the law becomes a shortcoming. For 
Bakan the compulsion to profitability stems from the legal definition of corporations: “Their 
legal makeup compels them to pursue profit and growth but say nothing about whether 
they have to abide by the law in doing so” (2020:57)  For Bakan corporations are “created by 
law” and “that’s a profound limit. And it’s one that’s dictated by law.” (2020: 31)  
That which was created in law can be changed by law, even ended. Bakan’s analysis 
suggests significant scope for political-legal activism.  This fits with his placing of social 
movements as support for an electoral political strategy, rather than the other way round 
(2020:147-175).  
Here is the problem, Bakan’s mode of analysis accepts an inversion. The law does not create 
the corporation in a one sided way. This is not an immaculate conception, but double 
parenthood between the capitalist state and society. We will argue that profit making is in 
the corporation’s fundamental nature as the configuration of capitalist social relations, 
which has been recognised by and given final form in law. The particular corporate form is a 
legally specified construct, but not the essential social relations nor indeed their necessary 
general form of appearance as the intersection of productive capital and money capital.  We 
can see in Bakan’s approach the gap between institutional change within the system, and 
revolutionary change of the system.  
 
Whyte’s Corporate Ecocide 
David Whyte’s analysis is stronger and his politics sharper. He establishes the colonial roots 
and function of the joint stock company as a ‘colonising machine’ used by ‘the European 
colonial powers to enclose land, organise slavery and monopolise trade (2020:81) He argues 
that these companies that were the preferred vehicles of West European expansion over 
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centuries were capitalist entities, pace the position of Meikins Wood (2003) that these were 
non-capitalist organisations (2020:197). This judgement fits with the wider Eurocentric 
positioning of Woods and Brenner that fails to appreciate the colonial levers of capital 
accumulation (see Higginbottom, 2020).  
For two centuries the joint stock company was the ‘primary vehicle’ that capital spread its 
colonial tentacles across the world (2020: 71). This is reinforced by Banaji’s extensive study 
of early commercial capitalism driven, “by joint-stock companies that emerged from the 
maritime fringe of northwestern Europe and enjoyed the strong backing of the state” 
(2020:48). 
A further strong point of Whyte’s account, especially welcome from a socialist in Britain 
where the perspective is all too rare, is his recognition of the general role of corporations 
profiting from neo-colonialism. He works from Kwame Nkrumah’s concept of nominally 
independent African countries still being subject to external economic control, especially in 
the ‘Commonwealth’ by UK and South African based multinational corporations continuing 
to extract wealth. Whyte identifies a repeating pattern, with three characteristics: a) 
corporations gain an advantage from the host state that allows them to exploit b) the host 
elite alone benefits and is put into opposition against its own population c) the corporations’ 
home states act to cement these alliances (2020:94-95) It is these alliances of protected, 
accelerated corporate extraction especially of natural source that Whyte rightly identifies as 
the main driver of ecocide, killing off of the planet’s ecosystems.       
Whyte is surely right to emphasise the significance of neo-colonialism in the changing role of 
the corporation.  In general terms multinational corporations not only profit from neo-
colonial conditions, very often they have sufficient power to shape and order neo-
colonialism as a condition that is highly propitious for them to make surplus-profits (see 
below for elaboration).  
Whyte presents a socialist critique of the corporation making the best arguments for the 
radical reform approach, as he rightly states any green movement must take on corporate 
power and dismantle corporate impunity. His contribution is however still pitched the 
political space of ‘left Labour’, the possibility of democratic socialism opened up by the 
Corbyn-McDonnell leadership broadly similar to the Sanders project in the US.  But the 
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corporation will not be defeated by political reform, no matter how radical.  In fact the 
‘green industrial revolution’ promoted by Corbyn and McDonnell was barely radical, let 
alone socialist, and much closer to the politics of nudge, little more than a leftist gloss to the 
direction that financial markets and the Bank of England are heading in any case, as argued 
in (Higginbottom, 2019). 
While agreeing with Whyte’s principal theses I want to fill in some gaps and hopefully give 
more depth to his argument.  The legal formation of the limited liability addition to the joint 
stock company form came about in the UK in 1855, in the US earlier (Whyte 2020:70).  The 
question is why? Was there any new impetus within the relations and material forces of the 
mode of production for this change of form? The answer lies in the changing dynamics 
between industry and empire, with finance hovering astride both. Up to this time the main 
field of operation of British joint stock companies had been making profits from empire. The 
massification of industrial capital accumulation into larger and larger production units as 
capital revolutionised the production process in the first half of the nineteenth century 
required ever larger concentrations of capital. For the UK case this is more clearly linked 
with the consolidation of factory production and turning around 1850 into the further 
development of modern industry.  
 
Deeper into Capital 
The corporation in Whyte is the vehicle for capital’s reproduction. This prompts reflection 
on the different perspectives from which Marx considered capital reproduction, across the 
three volumes of Capital.  In Volume 1 the reproduction of capital is considered in relation 
to class. In a key section arguing the necessity of transition to socialism (see below) Marx 
anticipates and borrows from the arguments he was to fill out with greater thoroughness in 
the intended Volume 3. Volume 2 explains capital reproduction through aggregated 
commodity circulation. Then in the first parts of Volume 3, Marx shows that the formation 
of the rate of profit is the systemic driver. Individual capitals reproduce themselves through 
appropriating surplus-value to make profits.  The common vector within this system of 
capitals competing across different commodity sectors is profitability. The rate of profit is 
the cardinal rule for the reproduction of industrial capital.   
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Marx commented that primitive accumulation comes into systemic combination in England 
at the end of the seventeenth century.  The colonial corporation was a central component 
of that system. But then came the industrial revolution accelerating in the late eighteenth 
century specific class antagonisms and contradictions, most notably the industrial cycle 
marked empirically by a rising and falling general rate of profit. Another set of levers, to 
offset the declining rate of profit industrial capital, were increasingly put into place over the 
first half of the nineteenth century.  The interests of industrial capital overcame resistance 
of landowner privilege and by 1850 were consolidated at the centre of the ruling class 
alongside the continuity of finance. This was the moment when the corporate form was 
renovated to suit the combined needs of capitalist industry as well as commercial empire.   
It was at this moment that Marx’s mature work was coming to fruition with the staggered, 
then delayed, publication of Capital. The unfolding of the work and the object of its study 
became intertwined. 
 
From Concentration to Centralisation  
The concentration of capital is, for Marx, the result of capital taking advantage of 
cooperation in the production process, bringing together the workers and means of 
production on an increasing scale (1976:446). The degree of concentration of capital in the 
hands of an individual capitalist becomes ‘the material condition’ for ‘the extent of co-
operation, or the scale of production, depends on the extent of this concentration.” 
(1976:448). This combination of concentration of the workforce and means of production 
on the one hand, and the amount of capital required to set them in motion on the other, 
increases as the social productivity of labour increases in turn with manufacture and then 
large scale industry, based on machine production and the factory system. 
In the general law of capitalist accumulation Marx explains that as the concentration of 
capital tends to increase its technical composition, and with that its organic composition, 
with relatively more capital advanced in constant capital than variable (1976: 775). Thusfar 
the individual capitals function as individual capitalists and their families. Marx notes that at 
a certain point capital accumulation in this form reaches its limits (1976:776)  
8 
 
He now introduces centralisation, the mechanism that is found to surpass this limit, as: 
concentration of capitals already formed, destruction of their individual 
independence, expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, transformation of many small 
into few large capitals (1976:777)  
Pradella (2013:126) points out that Marx revised the first German edition of Volume 1 
(1867) to include in the later, French edition (1872-5) the distinction between the 
concentration of capital and its centralisation. The late introduction and emphasis on the 
concept of centralisation in Volume 1 is an indication that the joint-stock company was 
actively present in Marx’s thinking even as it was still developing and pending his intended 
fuller exploration in Volume 3.   
In the reworked Volume 1, Marx makes connections that situate his analysis of the 
corporation as a vehicle for the centralisation of capital and related to that, how the credit 
system accelerates the rising technical composition of capital.   
The world would still be without railways if it had had to wait until accumulation had 
got a few individual capitals far enough to be adequate for the construction of a 
railway. Centralisation, however, accomplished this in the twinkling of an eye, by 
means of joint-stock companies. (Marx, 1976: 780)  
We will see that this is one side of the picture, as presented in Volume 1. But to reach that 
point we jump over to Volume 3, and catch Marx still working out his argument.    
Marx’s arresting ambiguity 
The text of Volume 3 is a patchy draft, and the further one proceeds into Part 5 ‘The Division 
of Profit into Interest and Profit of Enterprise’ the more evidently so.  The part’s heading is 
incomplete, for Marx looks at another relation of individual capitals with money capital, that 
which occurs through the purchase on the stock market of ownership shares, the formation 
joint stock company. The dividend payments yielded by equity shares had become another 
distribution of profit, beyond interest paid to the banks.   
In Chapter 27, ‘The Role of Credit in Capitalist Production’ Marx sees the joint stock 
company as a positive development for the productive forces, he wrote that the institution 
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allowed a ‘tremendous expansion in the scale of production, and enterprises which would 
be impossible for individual capitals’ (1981, 567). He then makes this truly arresting 
comment: 
Capital, which is inherently based on a social mode of production and presupposes a 
social concentration of means of production and labour-power, now receives the 
form of social capital (capital of directly associated individuals) in contrast to private 
capital, and its enterprises appear as social enterprises as opposed to private ones. 
This is the abolition of capital as private property within the confines of the capitalist 
mode of production itself. (1981:567)  
How are we to interpret this? One can understand the contrast of joint stock ownership is a 
social grouping of private capital owners, as against one individual private capital, but not 
surely of socially owned capital, and not of ‘the abolition of capital as private property’?  
One way to see this is that private property itself was changing, split between titular or 
nominal ownership and real possession of the production process. Marx sees here the  
Transformation of the actual functioning capitalist into a mere manager, in charge of 
other people’s capital, and of the capital owner into a mere owner, a mere money 
capitalist (1981:567) 
This certainly stresses the bifurcation between ownership and control in the modern 
corporation, anticipating what later theorists Berle and Means (1932) made so much of. 
There is one more surprise in store:  
This result of capitalist production in its highest development is a necessary point of 
transition towards the transformation of capital back into the property of the 
producers, though no longer as the private property of individual producers, but 
rather as their property as associated producers, as directly social property. It is 
furthermore a point of transition towards the transformation of all functions 
formerly bound up with capital ownership in the reproduction process into simple 
functions of the associated producers, into social functions. (1981:568) 
This is apparently positing the joint stock company was a point of transition to socialism. 
Engels steps in to remind the reader just how much the subsequent generations of joint 
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stock company have changed the form of industrial organisation. Even so, as it stands the 
above paragraph from Marx remains open to a reformist interpretation that the associated 
producers, the working class, can lay hold of the corporation and bend it towards socialist 
transition.   
Indeed within a few years of the publication of Volume 3 in 1894, and after Engels had 
passed away, Eduard Bernstein seized on this quote to argue that Marx recognised that 
adjustments in the modern economy were beginning to render his own doctrine of class 
struggle obsolete.  That in the new joint stock companies and the credit system that fed 
them, capitalism had found a way to diminish and even overcome its tendency to crisis. That 
with the growth of share ownership amongst the middle class and the emergence of a 
labour aristocracy all spoke to a strategic reorientation of social democracy (Bernstein, 
1899)  
Bernstein would have made his arguments with or without the claimed textual support from 
Marx. In her Social Reform or Revolution? young Rosa Luxemburg gave Bernstein’s open 
revisionism the most robust of responses. Nevertheless, what Bernstein argued openly took 
covert hold in the West European labour movements of the Second International, and has 
stayed as a hallmark of social democracy ever since.  Ultimately Bernstein’s position was 
that of the consolidated labour aristocracy supporting the imperialism on which its 
privileges are based, and the refutation of which has to be in practice and not just words.  
Had Marx taken a late right turn? I suggest that the ambiguities of Marx’s initial assessment 
of the joint stock company in Volume 3 Chapter 27, that Bernstein made  so much of to 
bolster his avowedly reformist position, are superseded in three ways: 
• by Marx’s polemical re-presentation of the contradictions in a decidedly 
revolutionary manner as the affirming climax of Volume 1 
• through many indications in Marx’s notebooks and correspondence in the last 15 
years of his life to 1881 - on this see (de Paula et al, 2014/5) 
• in Engels additions to the text in Part Five and his Supplement on the Stock Exchange 




Back to Volume 1: Centralisation of Capital as the Threshold of Revolution 
The famous passage in Volume 1, Chapter 31 The Genesis of Industrial Capital gives a 
completely different emphasis to the dialectical point already noted from Volume3, that 
joint stock companies had brought society of both the possibility and the necessity of a 
transition to socialism. Marx notes that at a certain point large capital became sufficiently 
dominant that it was eating up not only self-employed workers but even other large 
capitalists as well, continuing: 
This expropriation is accomplished through the action of the immanent laws of 
capitalist production itself, through the centralisation of capitals. One capitalist 
always strikes down many others...The centralisation of the means of production 
and the socialization of labour reach a point at which they become incompatible 
with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of 
capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated. (Marx, 1976: 
929) 
Here Marx is categorical that the transition can only take place by bursting asunder the 
modern corporation as centralised capital.  This of course did not yet happen, and indeed 
the dual tendency of real aggregation combining social labour within capitalism and serving 
as a prompt for the need for socialist association of labour reached its apogee in the 
decades immediately following. Marx identified the tendency to monopoly inherent in 
centralisation: 
In any given branch of industry centralisation would reach its extreme limit if all the 
individual capitals invested there were fused into a single capital. In a given society 
this limit would be reached only when the entire social capital was united in the 
hands of either a single capitalist or a single capitalist company. (Marx, 1976: 779) 
Engels inserted as a footnote to the 1890 English edition of Volume 1: 
The latest English and American ‘trusts’ are already striving to attain this goal by 
attempting to unite at least all the large-scale concerns in one branch of industry 




Marx here treats with not the genesis of industrial capital but the pre-condition of its 
demise, a degree of centralisation that has brought together, socialised, all production. 
Unfortunately for humanity, and despite Marx’s urgings, there was not one inevitable 
consequence, but two possible outcomes to this large scale production with an immanent 
tendency to monopoly: socialism or modern imperialism. 
 
Engels Additions to Volume 3 on Corporate Imperialism 
Engels editorship of Capital Volume 3 has attracted comment as to its theoretical veracity – 
see for example (Heinrich, 1996). In my view, Engels did a remarkable job in his aim to 
render Marx in his own words. Furthermore, Engels makes two most productive additions, 
the first being his Chapter 4, ‘The Effect of Turnover on the Rate of Profit’. The second is 
several small insertions in Part Five and his Supplement on the Stock Exchange that speak 
directly to our topic. Engels’ insertions are not written as direct contradictions to Marx’s line 
of analysis, written in the 1860s when the phenomenon of the limited liability joint stock 
company was at an initial stage. Marx’s thoughts on paper are left unmodified, but Engels 
insertions give a contrasting, more concrete and much less optimistic picture.  
 
In Chapter 28 Marx puts the limited liability company in the context of the expansion of the 
credit system and its role in the cycle of industrial capital, multiplying and accelerating the 
movements of revenues and money capital over the cycle.  Engels wrote in the 1890s after a 
real turn towards monopolisation of industry by the modern corporation. The centralisation 
of capital had reached the point that one corporate entity monopolised a whole sector; 
whether a cartel agreement between legally independent capitals working in close alliance, 
or a trust where the distinct capitals had merged into a single legal entity.  
The next stage, therefore, in certain branches where the scale of production 
permitted, was to concentrate the entire production of the branch of industry in 
question into one big joint-stock company with a unified management. In America 
this has already been achieved in several cases, while in Europe the biggest example 
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up till now is the United Alkali Trust, which has brought the entire British production 
of alkali into the hands of a single firm. (in Marx, 1981: 569).  
If Engels insertions in Part 5 put Marx’s text into a different light, reading at times as though 
they could have come from Lenin’s Imperialism, his Supplement to Volume 3 confirms this 
even further. It reads as an almost seamless transition of analysis from the mind of one 
author to another, from Engels to Lenin the problem is monopoly capitalism acting as 
modern imperialism. The very last words in Engels Supplement, that turned out to be his 
last testament, are:  
(6) Then there are foreign investments, all in joint-stock form. Just to take England: 
American railways, North and South (look up the stock list), gold mines, etc.  
(7) Then colonization. Today this is a pure appendage of the stock exchange, in 
whose interest the European powers divided up Africa a few years ago, and the 
French conquered Tunis and Tonkin. Africa directly leased out to companies (Niger, 
South Africa, German South-West and East Africa), and Mashonaland and Natal 
taken possession of for the stock exchange by Rhodes. (in Marx, 1981:1047)    
 
Fictitious Capital 
Thus far we have left to one side the question of money capital and how it relates in the 
corporation, which we now turn to. 
The concept of fictitious capital predates Marx but was adopted by him and 
characteristically given fresh dialectical content (Durand, 2017). Marx introduces fictitious 
capital in a number of guises in Part Five of Capital Volume 3. He distinguishes between real 
capital on the one hand (productive capital and commodity capital) and money capital on 
the other, which from a certain point, the explanation of banking capital, he presents as 
mostly fictitious:  
With the development of interest-bearing capital and the credit system, all capital 
seems to be duplicated, and at some points triplicated, by the various ways in which 
the same capital, or even the same claim, appears in various hands in different 
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guises. 3 The greater part of this ‘money capital’ is purely fictitious. With the 
exception of the reserve fund, deposits are never more than credits with the banker, 
and never exist as real deposits (1981: 601). 
This is a general reflection on the more specific idea of fictitious capital as a property claim 
on future profits (introduced in the paragraphs that follow this one). The overall point to 
keep in mind throughout is that the capitalist mode of production generates a kind of 
internal mirror on itself, a second realm of capital’s existence in relation to itself, as distinct 
from the realm of social capital’s relations with the externalities such as labour, nature, 
suppliers and customers. Capitalism generates and reproduces itself through the purely 
financial sphere of capital markets as well as the more concrete spheres of commodity 
production. Capital itself becomes a fetish, in the form of interest bearing capital and in its 
further credit derivatives (Marx: 1981, 523). These reflections have enormous consequences 
for the general concept of the corporation as an institutional form, in that it moves 
simultaneously in both the financial and operating spheres of capital. This duality gives rise 
to conceptions of the corporation as two faced, Janus like, and even double minded, 
schizophrenic. The corporation spans the accumulation of capital - the conversion of 
surplus-value - and its distribution as profit. 
In Chapter 25 ‘Credit and Fictitious Capital’, Marx gives a first indication of how fictitious 
capital arises in commercial trade based on the widespread practice of payment on for 
goods on credit through the instrument of the buyer raising a bill of exchange, as a promise 
to pay for the merchandise at a future date, that was backed by their bank. Fictitious capital 
occurs when a bill of exchange is drawn (issued) unconnected with any real shipment of 
goods. There is no exchange of goods, but a credit is nonetheless raised. The origin is fictive 
in the most literal sense, i.e. an invention of currency with no immediate basis in material 
production. But such frauds are mixed in with the great mass of bills of exchange that 
formed the basis of the credit system between individual capitalists and were settled daily 
in great volumes by inter-bank clearing by discount houses at the financial centre (London) 
and formed this fiction is nonetheless real in a different sense. (1981: 526). The bill of 
exchange is a form of promissory note, a promise to pay. While it arose in the context of 
banks backing merchant trade in commodities, banks themselves started to issue such bills 
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as promise to pay, an initial form of the bank note.  Indeed these bank issued promises to 
pay would circulate widely as means of payment.   
The role of banks and the credit system in raising fictitious capital goes further. Hudson 
aptly summarises, ‘bankers and other creditors produce interest-bearing debt’ (2010: 424).  
In Chapter 29 on ‘Banking Capital’s Component Parts’ Marx explains that when the state 
raises public debt, and issues notes promising to pay back its creditors on such and such a 
date, this too is fictitious capital (1981:595). Marx then comes to the key point:  
the formation of fictitious capital is known as capitalization. Any regular periodic 
income can be capitalized by, reckoning it up, on the basis of the average rate of 
interest, as the sum that a capital lent out at this interest rate would yield. 
(1981:597) 
This definition of fictitious capital is closer to the money form of any capital asset.   It is a 
title, a claim to property income. In the case of the joint stock company through the vehicle 
of share, the market capitalises a claim to future income as a combined ‘shareholder 
return’; the combination of dividends issued by the company and expected price movement 
of the share. A market is formed in which stocks (shares) are traded. Underpinning company 
share price is the capitalisation of the state led base interest rate revolving in the bond 
markets.   
The independent movement of these ownership titles’ values, not only those of 
government bonds, but also of shares, strengthens the illusion that they constitute 
real capital besides the capital or claim to which they may give title. (1981:598) 
Durand (2017:49) identifies Marx’s ambivalence towards fictitious capital particularly well.  
The multiplicity of fictitious capital’s forms is in Marx’s account synonymous with the 
expansion of the credit system within capitalism.  In the key Chapter 27 ‘The Role of Credit 
in Capitalist Production’ Marx explains that on the hand credit allows social capital to 
surpass the barriers of an individual capital that is self-financing; on the other hand credit 
has a necessarily speculative character, moreover the more the credit system develops the 
more forms of fictitious capital not directly to material production proliferate (Marx, 1981: 
572-573).    
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To what degree are the claims of fictitious capital backed by real asset values? A whole 
profession of stock pickers has mushroomed of analysts evaluating corporations and 
assessing whether the market sentiment has under or over-valued. This profession 
rationalises the interest of asset owners, from which perspective the only value of 
commercial enterprises is their current and future profitability. The role of the discipline of 
financial accounts is to render reliable and relatively objective measures of company 
profitability for the capital markets (Damodaran, 2012; Quiry et al, 2018).  From the investor 
perspective the role of the corporation is above all else to create ‘shareholder value’. 
Shareholder value became a cri de guerre in the neo-liberal offensive, and was heavily 
promoted to ensure that corporate senior management were fully aligned, through the 
concept of Economic Value Added (EVA) (Bennett Stewart, 1999).   This signalled a 
normative campaign to embed shareholder interest in the internal measures of corporate 
performance and executive management decision making.  
In his critique of the ‘value added’ discourse, Lordon (2000) explains that what lay behind it 
was the renewed power of the large institutional investors, the major mutual funds. This 
was to a significant degree driven by pension privatisations that dramatically expanding the 
supply of funds seeking assets that provide a return on investment. In the rich countries 
with state welfare regimes, neo-liberalism shifted society’s funding for the elderly from the 
state to private long term investment funds, the raising of these funds has in turn shifted 
from government bonds to commercial capital markets. The big idea was that private 
capital, not the state, would provide social security (and maintain grades of middle class 
privilege) into old age. Behind the rhetoric of an ‘Ownership Society’ came the reality of 
deepening inequality and the rise of impoverishment at the end of life for the working class  
(Soederberg, 2010: Chapter 2). 
Notice that of the processes many contemporary writers describe under the catch-all term 
‘financialisation’, those that apply to capital correspond to forms of fictitious capital and 
surplus-profits as identified by Marx. They are not particular to neoliberal capitalism, 
although neoliberalism accentuated them, but are long standing endemic forms of the 
capitalist mode of production, and cannot be gotten rid of by an anti-neoliberalism that 




Rent as Corporate Surplus-Profits 
Capital exploits and exhausts nature, but it must do so by employing labour-power and the 
means of production to process what is naturally embedded and convert it through primary 
sector process activities into the next stage of usable, commodified use-values.  The huge 
expansion of overseas capital investments in the late nineteenth century, principally from 
Britain, were largely concentrated on areas of production oriented towards exporting 
commodities to the industrial centres. The railway boom thrived because it applied the 
latest industrial technology to supply the infrastructure demanded by these newly opened 
up export sectors. To reverse the customary analogy, railways were the internet of the late 
nineteenth century.    
The category of rent is particularly significant for a Marxist understanding of the 
corporation. Whilst this is especially and most obviously so when it comes to multinational 
corporations operating in extractive fields such as mining, oil, agriculture, logging, indeed a 
the broad swath of activities in which capital exploits nature as note by Whyte, there is a 
further and more general consideration once we conceive of rent as a form of surplus-profit.  
All multinationals strive for surplus-profits and those that survive succeed in their 
appropriation of surplus-profits. The category of surplus-profit arising from the relations of 
capitalist production goes beyond ‘normal’ or average profits and moves towards capitalist 
monopolies.   
Differential rent in Marx 
Marx addresses ground rent in the capitalist mode of production from two directions. In 
Capital Volume 3 he approaches ground rent from the perspective of locally available gifts 
of nature enhancing labour productivity and thereby cheapening production and increasing 
surplus-value through enhanced labour conditions. This type of variation gives rise to 
surplus-profits available in the first instance to the capital operating or making use of that 
specifically available extraction of use-values from the natural world. Marx’s leading 
example here is the flow of water from a river that is used to turn a water wheel that in turn 
provides motor energy for a mill factory. The surplus-profit may be augmented by the 
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application of further capital, the construction of the water wheel and the formation of a 
reservoir to ensure steady water flow for example. The combination of these contributions 
by nature and capital render the collective of living labour using these elements as more 
productive, producing more volume for a given expenditure of effort. This is labour 
enhanced by nature in the confines of capitalist social relations. The enhanced labour 
reduces the cost of production, it creates an extra surplus-value that is the source of 
surplus-profit once the commodities are sold. The type of surplus-profit that such an 
arrangement makes possible may be retained by the capitalist, or they may have to pass it 
on to their landowner in whole or part depending on the ownership of the natural resource.  
Marx calls this type of rent differential rent, as it differentiates the price of production of 
competing producers in a given sector. The lower cost producers are able sell their 
commodities at a higher margin over their costs than competing higher cost producers (on 
marginal lands, or without water wheels) who are able to make no more than average 
profits (Marx, 1981, Part 6). 
 
This remarkable theoretical reconstruction by Marx of the internal relations involved 
anticipates and is reflected at the level of external resulting categories (cost and profit) by 
the widely used break even supply curves in the oil and mining sectors for example 
(Higginbottom, 2020)   
Marx developed the concept price of production as the necessary modification to simple 
commodity value in a capitalist system, where price of production is the sector modal cost 
of production plus the social average rate of profit. This differential rent form of surplus-
profit arises when the individual price of production of certain producers is less than the 
prevailing price of production, the difference being (once again) their surplus-profit.  Note 
that monopoly as in exclusive usage of a particular physical resource such as a section of 
river, a tract of land on the surface or below the surface, is required for an individual capital 
to take advantage of it; but this may be leased as property ownership of the resource may 
take different forms. Whatever the legal arrangements are, under capitalism this type of 
surplus-profit will be produced.  Whether the resource is owned by the state, by a private 
landlord or the operating capitalist, extra surplus-value will be produced and realised as a 
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surplus-profit. The property arrangements will determine which entity captures the surplus- 
profit. 
Differential technological rents as surplus-profits 
A recent study of Big Pharma applies Veblen’s notion of differential advantage (Klinge et al, 
forthcoming). Beyond the authors’ preferred Veblenian framework, their analysis of gives us 
a route to generalise from Marx’s differential rent as one form of surplus-profit in 
agriculture to a wider idea of individual capitals possessing a differential advantage that will 
allow them to generate a surplus-profit.  Veblen’s differential advantage could be an 
innovative production technique that allows that company’s workers to be more productive 
and produce commodities more cheaply than competitors. This type of differential 
advantage is a short step from the capital applied in agriculture, Marx’s second form of 
differential rent, and identical to the innovation identified in the initial phase of relative 
surplus-value in Volume 1 Chapters 12-15, except that the placing of the patent on the 
innovation will stop or at least slow down its spread to direct competitors, and to that 
degree prolong the period of surplus-profit for the innovating capital. If the individual 
capitalist who had first applied the waterwheel to production were able to patent the idea, 
they would have enjoyed an increased and sustained differential advantage through lower 
costs of production. This type of monopoly is not in abstract opposition to competition, but 
rather is a form of competition between individual capitals in a sector.  
Note further that this type of monopoly increases the price of the commodity above the 
simple value were that determined by the socially necessary labour time required for the 
commodity’s production. Instead the price is set higher, at a ‘false social value’ (Marx, 
1981:799), above the innovating producer’s individual value. The prevailing price covers the 
cost of production plus the average rate of profit and a further surplus-profit for the 
innovating producer. In terms of financial accounting, this type of patent would be identified 
as an intangible intellectual asset, with a certain value that, like a fixed asset, is considered 
as being passed over to the commodity product through the equivalent of annual 
depreciation, or in the case of intangibles, amortisation of the initial capital value (Klinge et 
al, forthcoming).   
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Absolute rent in Marx 
Marx identifies a second category of rent, which is his main entry point in Theories of 
Surplus-Value. In this enquiry there is a rent that arises for the agricultural sector as a whole, 
that is accrues to all landlords in the sector when private ownership of land acts as an 
obstacle to capital investment, where capitalists do not own land and have to pay to get 
access to it. Marx terms this absolute rent, perhaps misleadingly but we will stick with the 
accepted terminology. In Marx’s explanation the formation of absolute rent requires that a 
second condition be met, which is the average organic composition of the sector, 
agriculture in this case, is lower than the social average.  This lower organic composition of 
capita means that for any quantum of capital invested, relatively more of it is spent on 
buying the usage of labour power, more workers are employed, and therefore more 
surplus-value is produced in the sector compared to higher organic composition sectors.   
The second further dimension of rent relies heavily on his explanation of the divergence of 
commodities’ price of production from their simple value. In the formation of price of 
production, Marx posits that in a system of equalised rates of profit across different sectors, 
those commodities produced in ‘labour intensive’ sectors that employ relatively more 
workers will have prices of production lower than their simple exchange-values. The 
landlords in the sector can claim a rent, adding it to the commodities’ prices of production, 
but not necessarily exceeding their simple value (Marx, 1981: Chapter 45). 
Cheaper labour as an extension of absolute rent 
Consider the case where paying wages below the value of labour power increases the 
surplus labour produced in a sector.  This is a mechanism of changing the value composition 
of capital other than its technically based organic composition. In this case more surplus 
labour is set in motion per capital outlay, not because there are more workers per machine 
but because labour-power is cheaper. The ratio of variable capital to constant capital 
decreases because the amount of variable capital required is lower; the value composition 
of capital increases, not for technical reasons but for social reasons of more oppressive 
conditions of exploitation, for example historically of African gold mine workers 
(Higginbottom, 2011).  
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These conditions of labour super-exploitation modify Marx’s price of production (cost of 
production plus profit), evidently reducing the cost of production for those capitals with 
access to the cheaper labour-power. The extra surplus-value produced turns to surplus-
profit that can be realised either by the capitals immediately producing under cheap labour 
conditions as fully priced commodities, or by the commercial capital purchasing the same 
commodities at a lower price, as suggested by Marx even for normal profits (1981:131). 
These practices of unequal exchange express the global ‘race to the bottom’ that is the main 
social relation of the imperialism of the twenty first century (Smith, 2016). Indeed the whole 
secret of Apple’s phenomenal success is found in its ruthless exploitation of just these 
supply chain relations, whilst retaining control of the design, marketing and retail.     
 
Some Preliminary Exemplars of a Marxist Approach 
We give here only the briefest indications of way in which concepts of Marx’s Capital can be 
applied and developed through the analysis of the theory and history of multinational 
corporations. 
Multinational Investment Strategies 
Dunning’s influential but eclectic theory of the multinational enterprise adopted from 
Behrman (1972) a widely used classification of multinational corporate investment 
strategies as: 
• natural resource seekers  
• market seekers 
• efficiency seekers  
• strategic asset or capability seekers.  (Dunning and Lundan, 2008:67-68) 
These categories are a major organising principle for UNCTAD’s annual World Investment 
Reports, for example (UNCTAD, 2005).The last strategy of strategic asset seeking has 
mutated into corporate strategies seeking the privatisation of state assets on the one hand, 
and their knowledge seeking strategies on the other (UNCTAD, 2017).  
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We can readily align the first three of these investment strategies with different levers that 
corporations employ to increase surplus-value and thereby realise surplus-profits.  Natural 
resource seeking is clearly aligned with Marx’s and classical theories of rent. Market seeking 
strategies are generally driven by a combination of manufacturing innovation and product 
volume expansion characteristic of Marx’s relative surplus-value and the rising organic 
composition of capital.  The efficiency seeking strategy is mostly concerned with cost 
cutting, and corresponds to the additional dimension of surplus-value posited by the 
Marxist dependency school better known as labour super-exploitation.  
Even though presented here in an initial and highly schematic way, one can see the 
potential for exploring and filling out these   widely used but under-theorised categories, by 
exploring with the theory of surplus-value the internal relations and substance of different 
modes of surplus-labour extraction. 
 
Two British Neo-colonial Corporations 
The records of the UAC/Unilever and Lonrho indicate two different corporate pathways 
from colonialism to neo-colonialism.  
 In the 1930s the United Africa Company (UAC) had operations across Britain’s colonial 
possessions in West Africa, it was by far Britain’s biggest overseas trading company (Jones, 
2000:99)  Unilever saved the UAC from bankruptcy in 1932 (ibid:91), the two companies had 
an unusual arrangement that lasted decades, with UAC operating with relative autonomy 
within the group led by Unilever which in the meantime concentrated on its manufacturing 
production and its own trading empire (ibid: 105-106; Fieldhouse, 1994). The Anglo-Dutch 
group this was a hybrid mix of a corporation based on two distinct pillars; UAC as a combine 
of overseas commercial trading houses, Wilkins ‘free standing company’, and Unilever 
corresponding to the German/US model of a multinational enterprise built around the 
company’s domestic manufacturing as its core then going into exports and eventually 
overseas subsidiary production (Mollan, 2018).  
The Lonrho case is a contrasting story of transition from the colonial corporation to the neo-
colonial corporation. Its origin fits more closely with Wilkins designation of an overseas free 
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standing company making use of financial connection with the City of London. Lonrho was 
formed in 1909 in London in order to profit from the then just achieved conquest of 
Rhodesia, in which role it was a moderately successful exploiter of mines and ranches, 
sending regular dividends back to London for its shareholders. It is worth noting here that 
this enterprise was founded on imperialist violence, consolidated under white settler rule, 
and it was entirely parasitic on its African hosts; aspects not mentioned in Wilkins account.  
The weight of evidence is that Lonrho was selected by the UK state to play a significant role 
after 1960. That task was to re-forge loosening connections with the leaderships of the 
African states newly independent from Britain. Under Tiny Rowland’s executive leadership 
Lonrho was extraordinarily successful in this play. Within two decades the company had 
overtaken UAC/Unilever as the most highly capitalised British trading company (Jones, 2000: 
120) 
Rowland was hailed as a genius. According to one white settler admirer, he was ‘the best 
thing to hit Africa since Cecil Rhodes’ quoted in (Cronjé et al 1976:12). Rather than naked 
violence, Rowland’s preferred weapon was corruption. His legendary deal making élan 
rapidly built a huge web of joint venture companies. The typical arrangement was through a 
commercial agreement with the near kin of the political leader concerned; bolstered with 
titbits of luxury consumption, trips to Harrods store, private education and so on. In this way 
a truly neo-colonial conglomerate mushroomed, one that managed a plethora of profit 
producing assets from mines to car dealerships, entirely built top down. In the 1970s the 
company invested in mines in apartheid South Africa, paying African miners below the 
poverty minimum wage, whilst diverting profits through tax havens and extravagant 
executive remuneration.  
 
Multinational Corporate Imperialism: Reform or Revolution? 
Each of Capital’s three volumes has potential for theorising the corporation. Although Marx 
does not explicitly analyse the joint stock company well into Volume 3, its effects are 
already felt in the revolutionary crescendo he gives to Volume 1.   
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No more than the state, or indeed any ruling class institution, can the corporation be 
reformed into the service of socialism. It is a hierarchical structure uniting in one 
organisational form two groups of profiteers, therefore a structure that needs to be 
disorganised and broken up, as in Lenin’s smashing of the state apparatus. The two special 
bodies of corporate men (as they still are mostly) are the executive managers and the 
shareholders. The corporate form brings together these two wings in a collective identity to 
actively appropriate and distribute the profits of exploitation. Through the corporate form 
profits, already the disguised external form of surplus-value, are further normalised simply 
as ‘income’; the fuller title being private property income, and in the case of the 
corporation’s shareholders and their intermediaries, unearned income deriving only from 
possession of money put to use as capital.     
There are grounds for alliance in concrete struggles to curb corporate power, but the 
distinction between strategies corporate reform or revolution is coming to a head in this 
time of multiple and overlapping crises that we are living through. What brought us to this 
crisis, what are the solutions? The socialist answer is that the solutions cannot be reached 
within the limits of capitalism, the corporations and the unsustainable way of life they have 
generated are a systemic problem, to accept corporate agency in the solutions will only lead 
to further and greater problems down the line. 
The green industrial revolution is nothing if it is not anti-imperialist; and conversely the 
widespread anti-neo-colonial struggles need an anti-imperialist movement as allies within 
the centres of corporate imperialism. This movement must ready itself ideologically to start 
the revolution against the citadels of corporate power.  The struggles against corporate 
extractivism and ecocide proliferating across the neo-colonised Global South provide a 
different starting point, agency and living social base for an anti-imperialist green 
revolution. We need to kill the corporation because it is already killing our fellow human 
beings.  
The transition to socialism is simply unimaginable without disrupting, dismantling and 
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